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CAMPBELL C.2d 
JOHN IV A LEE CAMPBELL, as 
Contracts-Breach-Remedi.es.-One who has been injured by 
breach contract as rescinded and recover 
he has ; or he may keep 
of both at all times 
noet'n,rm ; or he may treat repudiation as 
for all purposes of performance, 
he would have realized if he had not been 
Agency- Contractual Liabilities of Principal to Agent.-If 
y···.-··y~·, in violation of contract of employment, terminates 
or or agent properly terminates it 
because of breach of contract by principal, agent is entitled at 
his election to receive either amount of net losses caused and 
principal's breach or, if there are no such 
losses or a small sum as nominal damages; or reasonable 
value of services previously rendered by principal, not limited 
by contract price, that for services for which a price 
is apportioned by of contract he is entitled to receive 
contract price and no more. 
[3] Attorneys-Compensation-Amount-Reasonable Fee.-In en-
tire attorney for fixed fee, when client 
attorney before he has completed con-
attorney may recover reasonable value of services per-
formed to time of 
[ 4] Master and Servant- Remedies for Wrongful Discharge-
Amount of Recovery.-One who is wrongfully discharged from 
employment and from further performance of his 
contract may elect as a general rule to treat contract as re-
scinded, may sue on a quantum me~·uit as if special contract of 
See Cal.Jur.2d, 
See Cal.Jur.2d, 
§ 292 et seq. 
§ 253; Am.Jur., Contracts, § 388. 
§ 123 et seq.; Am.Jur., Agency, 
Contract as limit of attorney's recovery on quantum 
meruit in event of his discharge without fault on his part, note, 
109 A.L.R. 674. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 181; 
Am.Jur., at § 195 et seq. 
McK. Contracts. ~ 249; [2] Agency, § 158; 
Attorneys, § 108; l\Iaster and Servant, § 41; [5] Work 
and Labor, § 45; § 12 Assumpsit, § 7; [8, 9] 
Attorneys, § 114; [10] Attorneys, 117, 129. 
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employment had never been recover reasonable 
value of services value exceeds con-
tract price. 
[5] Work and Labor-Evidence-Contract Price.-Where recovery 
is sought on quantum 
employment, contract 
reasonable value of 
[6] Assumpsit-Pleading.-~Inherent 
count in quantttm meruit where 
but has been prevented from 
repudiation of contract, is 
contract or its repudiation and 
[7] !d.-Effect of Express Contract-Contract Fully Performed.-
A common count may be used where only thing that remains 
to be done is payment of money due on express contract. 
[8] Attorneys-Compensation-Actions- Restitution.-In action 
by attorney to recover reasonable value of services rendered 
to client before attorney's discharge from employment under 
an express contract, rule that plaintiff should restore or offer 
to restore part payment for services which client had made 
is not necessary where plaintiff would be entitled to it in any 
event. 
[9] !d.-Compensation-Actions- Restitution.-Where attorney, 
suing for reasonable value of services rendered to client in 
divorce case, had performed practically all services he was 
employed to perform when he was discharged by client, and 
where court in that case had indicated its intention to give 
judgment against such client and all that remained was the 
signing of findings and judgment, rule is that remedy 
of restitution in money is not available to one who has fully 
performed his part of contract, if only part of agreed ex-
change for such performance that has not been rendered by 
defendant is sum of money constituting a liquidated debt, but 
that full performance does not make restitution unavailable 
if any part of consideration due from defendant in return is 
something other than a liquidated debt; in such eases he re-
covers full contract price and no more. 
[10] !d.-Compensation-Pleading: Judgment.-While it may be 
more appropriate for attorney, for reasonable value of 
services rendered to client in divorce case to his dis-
charge from employment under an express contract, to allege 
that price of such services was contract auy deficiency 
of pleading is eliminated defendant's ans>ver forth 
that factor and action can thus be said to be common count 
indebitatus assumpsit, and there being no dispute as to amount 
called for in contract, the services been in effect fully 
performed, court should render judgment for balance due on 
contract. 
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Angeles 
directions. 
Action for attorney's 
versed with 
William H. Neblett 
Superior Court of Los 
* Reversed with 
for defendant re-
Brett Smithers for Appellant. 
Clyde Shoemaker and 0. Smith for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff from a judgment for de-
fendant, administratrix of the estate of Roy Campbell, de-
ceased, in an action for 's fees. 
Plaintiff's cause of action was stated in a common count 
alleging that Roy Campbell became indebted to him in the 
sum of $10,000, the reasonable value of services rendered as 
attorney for Campbell; that no part had been paid except 
$450. Campbell died after the services were rendered by 
plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a claim against his estate for the 
fees which defendant rejected. Defendant in her answer de-
nied the allegations made and as a ''further'' defense alleged 
that plaintiff and Campbell entered into an "express written 
contract'' employing plaintiff as attorney for a stated fee of 
$750, and all work alleged to have been performed by plaintiff 
was performed under that contract. 
According to the of the trial court the claim 
against the estate was founded on the alleged reasonable 
value of legal services rendered by plaintiff for Campbell 
in an action for separate maintenance by defendant, Camp-
bell's wife, against Campbell and in which the latter cross-
complained for a divorce. Plaintiff was not counsel when 
the pleadings in that action were filed. He came into the 
case on December 16, 1949, before trial of the action. He 
and Campbell entered into a written contract on that date 
for plaintiff's representation of Campbell in the action, the 
contract stating that plaintiff agrees to represent Campbell 
in the separate maintenance and divorce action which has been 
set for trial in the superior court for a "total fee" of $750 
plns court costs and other incidentals in the sum of $100 mak-
ing a total of The fees were to be paid after trial. 
Plaintiff represented at the trial consuming 29 days 
and lasting until :IVIay, 1950. (Defendant's complaint for 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
rl'he findings in the divorce action 
Plaintiff's services furnished 
The reasonable value of the services was 
paid $450 to and the costs. 
301 
The court concluded that should take nothing 
because neither his claim the estate nor his action 
was on the contract but were in rnerttit and no 
recovery could be had for the reasonable value of the services 
because the compensation for those services was covered by 
the express contract. 
According to plaintiff's Campbell 
told him after defendant had offered proposed findings in 
the divorce action that he was dissatisfied with plaintiff as 
his counsel and would discharge him and asked him if he 
would sign a substitution of under which Campbell 
would represent himself. Plaintiff replied that he recognized 
Campbell had a right to discharge him but that he was pre-
pared to carry the case to conclusion; that he expected to 
be paid the reasonable value of his services which would be 
as much as defendant's counsel in the divorce action received, 
$9,000, to which Campbell he was not going to pay 
"a cent more." (At that time Campbell had paid $450.) 
Thereupon the substitution (dated January 25, 1951) was 
signed and Campbell took plaintiff's file in the divorce case 
with him. 
It seems that the contract of employment contemplated 
that plaintiff was to continue his services and representation 
at least until and including final judgment in the divorce 
action. (See Neblett v. Getty, 20 Cal.App.2d 65 [66 P.2d 
473] .) It might thus appear that plaintiff was discharged 
before he had fully completed his services under the contract 
and the discharge prevented him from completing his per-
formance. (That question is later discussed.) 
One alleged rule of law applied by the trial court and that 
urged by defendant is that where there is a contract of 
employment for a definite term which fixes the compensa-
tion, there cannot be any recovery for the reasonable value 
of the services even though the employer discharges the em-
C.2d 
term; 
an action on the 
for the breach 
that theory and 
plaintiff did not 
for damages for 
the services 
there 
was wrong-
contract by 
breach of it, or whether 
at the time of this 
The rule in accord with the general contract 
law. the law to contracts or employ-
ment an client. [1] 'l'he general rule is 
stated: ''. who has been injured by a breach of 
c-ontract has an election to pursue any of three remedies, to 
wit: 'He may treat the eontraet as rescinded and may recover 
upon a meruit so far as he has performed; or he 
may keep the contract for the benefit of both parties, 
being at all times and able to perform; or, third, he may 
treat the putting an end to the contract for 
a 11 purposes of and sue for the profits he would 
have realized if he had not been preyented from performing.' " 
(Alder Drudis, 30 Cal.2d 372, 381 [182 P.2d 195] ; see 12 
Cal.Jnr § ; Hest. Contracts, § 347.) It is 
the same in agency or contract for services cases. [2] "If 
the principal, in Yiolation of the contract of employment, 
terminates or repudiates the employment, or the agent prop-
erly terminates it beeause of breach of contract by the princi-
paL the agent is entitled at his election to receive either: 
'' the amount of the net losses caused and gains pre-
vented the principal's breach or, if there are no such 
losses or a small sum as nominal damages; or 
'' (b) the reasonable Yalue of the services previously rend-
ered the principal, not limited by the contract price, except 
that for services for which a price is apportioned by the terms 
of the contract he is entitled to receiye the contract price and 
no more. 
''Comment: 
''a. In no event is the agent entitled to compensation for 
servic:es unperformed. If, however, the principal terminates 
the relationship in breach of contract, or if the agent chooses 
OLIVER v. 
to terminate it because of a 
the agent is at his 
r~ontract. If he affirms the 
rule 8tated in Clause 
the contract the 
way of restitution. 
states the con8equences of disaffirmance 
bility of restitution a8 a where 
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been completed, for which been appor-
tioned." (Rest. Agency, § 455.) rend-
ered consists of services, there cannot from the 
nature of legal remedies, be actual but it is pos-
sible to give the equivalent in value under a common count. 
Since money paid may be thus recovered and similarly in 
the United States in many would re-
quire such a remedy; and it is allowed :in but only in 
part. If the plaintiff bas fully the or a 
severable part thereof, and 'if the only of the agreed 
exchange for such performance that has not been rendered 
by the defendant is a sum of money a liquidated 
sum,' the only redress he has for breach of contract by the 
other side is damages for the breach. It is true that if the 
performance to which he is entitled in return is a liquidated 
sum of money, he may sue in indebitatus and not 
on the special contract, but the measure of damages is what 
he ought to have received--not the value of what he has 
given. If, however, the plaintiff has only partly performed 
and has been excused from further prevention 
or by the repudiation or abandonment of the contraet by the 
defendant, he may recover, either in England or America, 
the value of the services rendered, though such a remedy is 
no more necessary than where he has fully performed, since 
in both cases alike the plaintiff has an effectual remedy in an 
action on the contract for damages. In some jurisdictions, 
if a price or rate of compensation is fixed the contract, 
that is made the conclusive test of the value of the serviees 
rendered. More frequently, however, the plaintiff is allowed 
to recover the real value of the services though in excess of 
the contract price. The latter rule seems more in accordance 
with the theory on which the right of action must be based-
304 [43 C.2d 
c;:,c,uL'wcc•, and the plaintiff re-
as possible.'' (Willis-
Haub v. Coustette, 
, contract less reasonable 
allowed; Blair v. Brownstone 
394 P. 160], dictum; 
630 P. ; Laiblin v. 
516 [213 P. 529]; Willis-
1485; Corbin on Con-
tracts, 164 Cal. 160 [128 P. 
29]; Davidson v. 138 Cal. 320 P. 345, 5 L.R.A. 
N.S. 579] ; Brown Ct·own Gold JJ!illing Co., 150 Cal. 376 
[ 89 P. 86].) And in entire contracts employing an at-
torney for a fee it has been said that when the client 
wrongfully the attorney before he has completed 
the contract, the may recover the reasonable value 
of the services performed to the time of discharge. (Neblett 
v. Getty, supra, 20 Cal.App.2d dictum; Lessing v. Gib-
bons, 6 Cal.App.2d 598 [45 P.2d 258]; ll!cMantts v. Mont-
gomery, 12 Cal.2d 397 [84 P.2d 787], dictum; Echlin v. 
Superior Court, 13 Cal.2d 368 [90 P.2d 63, 124 A.L.R. 719], 
dictum; Kirk v. 202 Cal. 501 [261 P. 994]; Ayres v. 
Lipschutz, 68 Cal.App. 134 [228 P. 720] ; 109 A.L.R. 674.) 
Inasmuch as the contract has been repudiated by the employer 
before its term is up and after the employee has partly per-
formed and the employee may treat the contract as "re-
scinded,'' there is no longer any contract upon which the em-
ployer can rely as fixing conclusively the limit of the com-
pensation-the reasonable value of services recoverable by 
the employee for his part performance. [ 4] Hence it is 
stated in Lessing v. Gibbons, supra, 6 Ca1.App.2d 598, 607, 
that : "It is well settled that one who is wrongfully discharged 
and prevented from further performance of his contract may 
elect as a general rule to treat the contract as rescinded, 
may sue upon a quanturn rnm·uit as if the special contract of 
employment had never been made and may recover the reason-
able value of the services performed even though such reason-
able value exceeds the contract price.'' That statement is 
quoted with approval in Neblett v. Getty, supra, 20 Cal..App. 
2d 65, 70 (dictum). 'l'he same is said in Laiblin v. San 
Joaquin Agr. Corp., supra, 60 Cal.App. 516, quoting with 
approval from sections 1459, sttpm, and 1485 of Williston 
on Contracts. (See also Adams v. Burbank, 103 Cal. 646 [37 
P. 640] ; Gray v. Bekins, 186 Cal. 389 [199 P. 767] ; Tubbs 
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v. Delillo, 19 CaLApp. 612 ; 23 Cal.L.Rev. 313; 
109 A.L.R. 674.) [5] Of course the contract is com-
petent evidence bearing on the reasonable value of the ser-
vices. (Adarns v. CaL 646; Kimes v. 
Davidson Inv. Co., 101 P. ; Rest. 
§ 347, Corn. 
It is true that in the 
598), the trial court found express contract of 
employment of the but in 
affirming the judgment for reasonable value of the services 
the District Court of Appeal as one of its and in 
making the above quoted assumed that there was 
an express contract fixing the fees. In Elconin v. Yalen, 208 
Cal. 546 (282 P. 791], there was involved a case where the 
fees were not stated in the contract of employment and the 
court's statement that if there had been such a it would 
have "measured" the amount of recovery, was dictum. It is 
not clear whether it was meant that such a contract would be 
only evidence of the amount or the conclusive measure. More-
over it cited for its dictum Kirk v. supra, 202 Cal. 501, 
and Webb v. Trescony, 76 Cal. 621 P. 796], which merely 
held that where an attorney is wrongfully discharged under 
a partially performed contract he may sue for damages for the 
breach and in a proper case the full contract price may be 
the measure of damages. The same is true of Denio v. City 
of Huntington Beach, 22 Cal.2d 580 [140 P.2d 392, 149 
A.L.R. 320], and Zurich G. A. & L. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Kinsler, 
12 Cal.2d 98 [81 P.2d 913]. 
[6] Inherent in the right to plead by common count in 
quantum meruit where the employee has partly performed 
but has been prevented from full the em-
ployer's repudiation of the contract, is the principle that 
he need not plead the contract or its repudiation and his 
rescission of it. There are cases indicating that those special 
facts should be pleaded (see Roche v. Baldwin, 135 Cal. 522 
[65 P. 459, 67 P. 903]; 5 Cal.Jur.2d, Assumpsit, § 9; 14 So. 
Cal.L.Rev. 288) but the well established rule is that a com-
mon count declaration is sufficient under the circumstances 
above mentioned. (See authorities cited supra; 5 Cal.Jur.2d 
Assumpsit, §§ 10, 11, 12, 22, 25; 14 So.Cal.Il.Rev. 288.) 
[7] A common count may be used where the only thing that 
remains to be done is the payment of money. (O'Connor v. 
Dingley, 26 Cal. 11; Castagnino v. Balletta, 82 Cal. 250 [23 
P. 127] ; Donegan v. Houston, 5 Cal.App. 626 [90 P. 1073].) 
806 OLIVER C.2d 
In the instant case an that remained to 
\Yas the of the amount still due on the contract as it 
its terms after trial of the divorce action. 
further be noted that under the evidence 
on the above in effect promptly 
notified Campbell of the rescission of the contract when he 
advised him that he would execute the substitution of at-
torneys when he was but told 
bell he ·would hold him 
[8] On the issue of the of restoration or offer to 
restore the part for the services which had 
made, the rule that such restoration is not necessary 
where plaintiff would be entitled to it in any event. (See 
]{ales v. Houghton, 190 Cal. 294 [212 P. 21]; Silvey v. Fink, 
99 Cal.App. 528 [279 P. 202] ; JYJitchell v. Samnels, 39 Cal. 
App. 134 [178 P. 336]; Sime v. Malouf, 95 Cal.App.2d 82 
[212 P.2d 946, 213 P.2d 788]; Rest. Contracts, § 349.) It is 
clear that plaintiff was entitled to receive the $450 paid to 
him either under the contract or for the reasonable value of his 
scrYiccs. 
The question remains, ho1vever, of the application of the 
foregoing rules to the instant case. Plaintiff had performed 
practically all of the services he was employed to perform 
when he was discharged. The trial was at an end. The 
court had indicated its intention to give judgment against 
Campbell and all that remained was the signing of findings 
and judgment. The full sum called for in the contract was 
payable because the trial had ended. [9] Under these cir-
cumstances it would appear that in effect, plaintiff had com-
pleted the performance of his services and the rule would 
apply that: "The remedy of restitution in money is not avail-
able to one who has fully performed his part of a contract, 
if the only part of the agreed exchange for such performance 
that has not been rendered by the defendant is a sum of money 
constituting a liquidated debt; but full performance does not 
make restitution unavailable if any part of the consideration 
due from the defendant in return is something other than a 
liquidated debt." (Hest. Contracts, § 350; Locke v. Duchesnay, 
84 Cal.App. 448 [258 P. 418] ; Willett & Burr v. Alpert, 181 
Cal. 652 [185 P. 976]; Williston on Contracts (rev.ed.), 
§ 1459; Corbin on Contracts, § 1110; Code, § 3302.) In 
such cases he recovers the full eontract price and no more. 
As we have seen, as far as pleading is concerned, however, 
the action may be stated as a common count other than a 
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contract. Here plaintiff alleged 
indebtedness on defendant's for services performed 
of a reasonable value of $10,000 of which only 
had been [10] While it may have been more 
appropriate for him to have alleged that the price of such 
services was the contract any deficiency of the plead-
is eliminated defendant's answer forth that 
factor. Plaintiff's action can thus be said to be common count 
inckbitatus and there no dispute as to the 
amount called for in the contract, the services having been 
in effect fully performed, the court should have rendered 
for the balance due on the contract which is conceded 
be $300. 
The judgment is therefore reversed and the trial court 
directed to render judgment in favor of plaintiff for the 
sum of $300. 
Shenk, Acting C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, .J., concurred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. I agree with a great deal of 
the discussion in the majority opinion, and even to a larger 
extent with the authorities therein cited, relative to the rules 
of law which should govern this case but I think this court 
misapplies the very rules it cites. 
Specifically, I think this court errs when it says "there 
no dispute as to the amount called for in the contract, 
the services having been in effect fully performed, the court 
should have rendered judgment for the balance due on the 
contract which is conceded to be $300.'' 'I' he foregoing state-
ment is neither supported faetually by the record nor legally 
the authorities cited. 
Upon the record and the authorities the judgment should 
be reversed and the cause remanded either (a) with directions 
to the trial court to enter judgment for the plaintiff for $5,000 
(b) for a retrial upon all issues. I would prefer to end 
the litigation by adopting alternative (a) and in my view 
the record fully justifies that disposition of the cause. Di-
rected to that conclusion is the succinctly stated opinion pre-
by Justice Vallee when the cause was before the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal (reported at (Cal.App.) pp. 932-933. 
265 P .2d) and I adopt it as a most worthy presentation of 
the views which I think should prevail: 
C.2d 
be re-
to render judg-
:l'ound that the 
services by plaintiff is 
witness who testified concerning 
The of this court 
of with respect to 
toto in the margin.1 I think 
any discussion with Dr. Campbell 
of that contract sometime after 
and about the time that you 
drawn by Mr. Shoemaker for 
for plaintiff]. 
with Dr. Campbell about that time 
What was said 9 . A. Dr. Campbell came into my office and 
he was dissatisfied with the announced judgment of the court. 
Mrs. Campbell should have been allowed nothing in way 
told Dr. Campbell thnt :1fter 28 years of married life and 
~""n""'h' and his earning capacity that I thought the least the 
eourt allowed would have been possibly $250.00 a month. 
'' 'He nlso stated to me at that time that he was dissatis:fied with the 
that J\lr. 
plaintiff. 
amendments that I had on the :findings of fact and 
of law because he findings should state in there 
Shoemaker had suborned and bribed certain witnesses for the 
'' 'I told Dr. that there was no evidence of any such action 
on the Mr. ;::;r•o~·m:1K13r and that I was not going to submit to 
in that regard. 
if I wouldn't run this case the way he 
me, aud asked me if I would sign a 
suLstitution of attorneys. I him that I recognized that he had the 
power to discharge me as his attorney, that I was prepared to carry the 
case to a conelusion, and I thought the case would be reversed on 
appeal. added.] 
" 'He said " ' he wanted to act as his own attorney, so he could 
argue the findings himself; and with that I prepared the sub-
stitution which is in the file, and Dr. Campbell signed it 
and I signed it. 
'' 'He left the office carrying the files of this case, the divorce case, 
and also the file of the Municipal Court case with him, and that is the 
substance of the conversation. 
'' 'Q. You turned over to Dr. Campbell at that time all of the :files 
in Campbell? A. The two cases. 
And other case that is, the case in the Municipal CourU 
A. The entire file. 
'' 'Q. You have had nothing to do with the case from that time until 
no-.:d A. I have not. 
'' 'Q. J\Ir. Oliver, will you look in the file of Campbell against Camp-
hell, Number D370,670, and find the substitution to which you have just 
referred? A. Here it is. 
'' 'Q. This substitution which you have presented to me appears to 
have been signed by Dr. Campbell, January 25, 1951, and by John Oliver 
OLIVER v. CA~fPBELL 
[43 C.2d 298; 273 P.2d 
no reasonable conclusion can be drawn from 
than that the discharge amounts to clear 
h"·""'"nr.n of the contract in its 
tiff is entitled to recover the 
The contract 
did not limit his services the trial 
Under the contract he 
until final judgment, and he told the 
the case would be reversed on 
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the eYidence will be no different 
Campbell is dead. Plaintiff is the 
on a retrial. 
witness who can 
account of Ralph D. Paonessa and John Oliver on ihe same day~ 
A. That is correct. 
"'Q. That is Dr. Campbell's signature~ A. That is Dr. Campbell's 
signature; he signed that in my presence; and that is 
" 'Q. That reads: "Defendant and 
stitntes himself Roy Campbell in pro. 
plare of Ralph D. Paonessa and .John 
" 'and under that: "Vie eon sent to the nboYc substitution, dated: 
.January 25, 1951." 
'' 'Then on the other page there is another signature of. Dr. Campbell 
above ''substitution accepted.'' A. That is correct. 
'' 'Q. Did you have any conversation at that time with Dr. Campbell 
about compensation? A. Yes, I told him that I expected to be paid the 
reasonable value .•. 
" ' (Continuing) That I expected to be a reasonable value for 
my services. He says: "What do think reasonable value of your 
services are~" I said, "I to be paid as much as nir. Shoe-
maker.'' ... 
'' 'Q. When you told Dr. Campbell that you expected to be and 
you expected to be paid approximately, or the same amount was 
allowed Mr. Shoemaker wlmt did Dr. Campbell say~ A. He said, "I 
am not going to pay you a cent more.'' ' '' 
"
2 
'The contract reads: 
''December 16th, 1949 
" 'We, the undersigned do hereby agree to Roy 
in an action for separate maintenance instituted wife, Iva 
Campbell and on cross-complaint for diYorce Campbell 
against his wife, and which has been set for trial for 20th, 
1950 in Department 1 of the Superior Court of the County Los 
Angeles State of California for a total fee of $750.00 Court Costs 
and other incidentals in the sum of $100.00 making a snm of $850.00. 
Said fees of $7 50.00 to be pa \d after trial. 
" 'Ralph D. Paonessa 
'' 'J olm Oliver 
" 'I accept the serYices of Ralph D. Paonessa and Jolm Oliver as 
per above agreement. 
""The court fails to state that in 4uv~<.nncwJrc; 
asking him with respect to tho 
defendant's attorney 
Paonessa on the 
under section 1880 of the 
310 DAwsoN v. GoFF [43 C.2d 
to the conversation. There is in plaintiff's 
testimony to impugn his He did all any lawyer of 
the highest professional could have done under 
the conditions. Defendant waived plaintiff's disqualification 
under the dead man's (Deacon v. Bryans, 212 
Cal. 87, 90-93 [298 P. Defendant will be unable to 
make any showing to the of the of plain-
tiff. Under these the should be re-
versed with directions as I have indicated. (Conner v. 
Grosso, 41 Cal.2d 229, 232 (259 P.2d .) " 
Dooling, J. pro concurred. 
A. No. 23175. In Bank. July 30, 1954.] 
DOROTHY C. DAWSON, as Special Administratrix, etc., 
et al., Appellants, v. CHARLES R. GOFF et al., Re-
spondents. 
[la, lb] Venue-Actions Ex Contractu.-Code Civ. Proc., § 395, 
subd. 1, relating· to venue in contract actions, requires that 
all actions arising on contract shall be tried in county in which 
defendant resides or in which contract was made, unless de-
fendant has contracted specially and in writing as to county 
in which his obligation is to be performed, in which event such 
county is also a proper county for trial of action. 
[2] !d.-Actions Ex Contractu.-As regards question of venue, 
obligation of contract is incurred at time contract is made, 
and obligations under it arise and arc incurred in county in 
which it is made. 
[3] !d.-Actions Ex Contractu.-Under Code Civ. Proc., § 395, 
subd. 1, rdating to yenue in contract actions, county where 
contract is made is deemed to be county where it is to be 
performed unless there is a special written contract to the 
contrary. 
[4] Corporations-Transfers of Stock-Sales-Questions of Law. 
-Whether letter written by defendants to plaintiff in which 
they "agree" to purchase certain corporate stock from plain-
tiff on demand and on which plaintiff's sig·nature appears after 
notation "Accepted," or whether plaintiff's subsequent written 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Venue,§ 17 et seq.; Am.Jur., Venue,§ 19 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 12, 14] Venue, § 26; [4] Corpora-
tions, § 306; [5] Corporations, § 305; [6-11, 13) Contracts, § 17. 
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